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DOI10.1016/j.forpol.2014.03.006
Incentivizing cooperative agreements for sustainable forest management Experimental tests of alternative structures and institutional rules
McEvoy, David1; Jones, Michael2; McKee, Michael1; Talberth, John3
发表日期2014
ISSN1354-1013
卷号44页码:34-41
英文摘要

Non-industrial private forestland owners (NIPFs) manage the majority of US forestland. But land use conversion is the highest among this group, in part due to the relative paucity of income earned, these agreements can provide opportunities for long term payments from sales of timber and ecosystem services at levels sufficient to reduce the temptation to convert. In this structured well, these agreements can provide opportunities for long term payments from sales of timber and ecosystem services at levels sufficient to reduce the temptation to convert. In this paper we investigate various means of encouraging meaningful participation in cooperative agreements for forests that emphasize conservation. We report on the results obtained through a series of laboratory market experiments in which the participants play the role of NIPFs and make resource allocation decisions facing real financial incentives. Our results shed light on the relative factors that affect the success of these agreements. In particular, we find that when agreements include contribution thresholds (with money back guarantees) coupled with relatively long contract lengths, the groups are able to preserve a significant fraction of forested lands through conservation agreements. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.


英文关键词Conservation agreement;Participation;Economic laboratory experiment
语种英语
WOS记录号WOS:000338404100005
来源期刊FOREST POLICY AND ECONOMICS
来源机构世界资源研究所
文献类型期刊论文
条目标识符http://gcip.llas.ac.cn/handle/2XKMVOVA/56104
作者单位1.Appalachian State Univ, Boone, NC 28608 USA;
2.Bridgewater State Univ, Bridgewater, MA 02324 USA;
3.World Resources Inst, Washington, DC 20002 USA
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
McEvoy, David,Jones, Michael,McKee, Michael,et al. Incentivizing cooperative agreements for sustainable forest management Experimental tests of alternative structures and institutional rules[J]. 世界资源研究所,2014,44:34-41.
APA McEvoy, David,Jones, Michael,McKee, Michael,&Talberth, John.(2014).Incentivizing cooperative agreements for sustainable forest management Experimental tests of alternative structures and institutional rules.FOREST POLICY AND ECONOMICS,44,34-41.
MLA McEvoy, David,et al."Incentivizing cooperative agreements for sustainable forest management Experimental tests of alternative structures and institutional rules".FOREST POLICY AND ECONOMICS 44(2014):34-41.
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