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DOI | 10.1016/j.forpol.2014.03.006 |
Incentivizing cooperative agreements for sustainable forest management Experimental tests of alternative structures and institutional rules | |
McEvoy, David1; Jones, Michael2; McKee, Michael1; Talberth, John3 | |
发表日期 | 2014 |
ISSN | 1354-1013 |
卷号 | 44页码:34-41 |
英文摘要 | Non-industrial private forestland owners (NIPFs) manage the majority of US forestland. But land use conversion is the highest among this group, in part due to the relative paucity of income earned, these agreements can provide opportunities for long term payments from sales of timber and ecosystem services at levels sufficient to reduce the temptation to convert. In this structured well, these agreements can provide opportunities for long term payments from sales of timber and ecosystem services at levels sufficient to reduce the temptation to convert. In this paper we investigate various means of encouraging meaningful participation in cooperative agreements for forests that emphasize conservation. We report on the results obtained through a series of laboratory market experiments in which the participants play the role of NIPFs and make resource allocation decisions facing real financial incentives. Our results shed light on the relative factors that affect the success of these agreements. In particular, we find that when agreements include contribution thresholds (with money back guarantees) coupled with relatively long contract lengths, the groups are able to preserve a significant fraction of forested lands through conservation agreements. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. |
英文关键词 | Conservation agreement;Participation;Economic laboratory experiment |
语种 | 英语 |
WOS记录号 | WOS:000338404100005 |
来源期刊 | FOREST POLICY AND ECONOMICS
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来源机构 | 世界资源研究所 |
文献类型 | 期刊论文 |
条目标识符 | http://gcip.llas.ac.cn/handle/2XKMVOVA/56104 |
作者单位 | 1.Appalachian State Univ, Boone, NC 28608 USA; 2.Bridgewater State Univ, Bridgewater, MA 02324 USA; 3.World Resources Inst, Washington, DC 20002 USA |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | McEvoy, David,Jones, Michael,McKee, Michael,et al. Incentivizing cooperative agreements for sustainable forest management Experimental tests of alternative structures and institutional rules[J]. 世界资源研究所,2014,44:34-41. |
APA | McEvoy, David,Jones, Michael,McKee, Michael,&Talberth, John.(2014).Incentivizing cooperative agreements for sustainable forest management Experimental tests of alternative structures and institutional rules.FOREST POLICY AND ECONOMICS,44,34-41. |
MLA | McEvoy, David,et al."Incentivizing cooperative agreements for sustainable forest management Experimental tests of alternative structures and institutional rules".FOREST POLICY AND ECONOMICS 44(2014):34-41. |
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