Climate Change Data Portal
| DOI | 10.1177/10591478231224911 |
| Environmental Regulation Design: Motivating Firms' Clean Technology Investments With Penalties and Subsidies | |
| 发表日期 | 2024 |
| ISSN | 1059-1478 |
| EISSN | 1937-5956 |
| 起始页码 | 33 |
| 结束页码 | 1 |
| 卷号 | 33期号:1 |
| 英文摘要 | The recently enacted Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) includes a number of incentive-based programs (e.g., tax credits) designed to motivate firms to develop new clean technologies for fighting climate change. However, the IRA also includes a fee firms incur for excessive methane emissions. This represents the first time the United States government has ever levied a fee on greenhouse gas emissions, and it raises an interesting research question-how should a budget-constrained regulator balance the use of both incentive and penalty-based levers for stimulating investment in clean technology development? In this paper, we examine a regulator's optimal penalty and subsidy decisions for motivating firms to invest in clean technology development. We illustrate how the level of competitive intensity in the market can influence a budget-constrained regulator with multiple competing objectives-the environment, firm profits, and consumer welfare. We find that a subsidy is always beneficial, irrespective of the regulator's objective. While imposing a firm penalty always benefits the environment, it always negatively impacts the sum of firm profits and consumer welfare. However, depending on the level of competition in the market, instances can occur where imposing a high penalty actually benefits total firm profits or consumer welfare (separately). Interestingly, a regulator that cares about all three dimensions of its objective equally, should always set the penalty to either its minimum or maximum value, depending on whether the environmental cost of the harmful product is high or low. |
| 英文关键词 | Sustainability; regulation; penalty; subsidy; technology investment; competition |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| WOS研究方向 | Engineering ; Operations Research & Management Science |
| WOS类目 | Engineering, Manufacturing ; Operations Research & Management Science |
| WOS记录号 | WOS:001224926800001 |
| 来源期刊 | PRODUCTION AND OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT
 |
| 文献类型 | 期刊论文 |
| 条目标识符 | http://gcip.llas.ac.cn/handle/2XKMVOVA/298070 |
| 作者单位 | North Carolina State University |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | . Environmental Regulation Design: Motivating Firms' Clean Technology Investments With Penalties and Subsidies[J],2024,33(1). |
| APA | (2024).Environmental Regulation Design: Motivating Firms' Clean Technology Investments With Penalties and Subsidies.PRODUCTION AND OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT,33(1). |
| MLA | "Environmental Regulation Design: Motivating Firms' Clean Technology Investments With Penalties and Subsidies".PRODUCTION AND OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT 33.1(2024). |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
| 个性服务 |
| 推荐该条目 |
| 保存到收藏夹 |
| 导出为Endnote文件 |
| 谷歌学术 |
| 谷歌学术中相似的文章 |
| 百度学术 |
| 百度学术中相似的文章 |
| 必应学术 |
| 必应学术中相似的文章 |
| 相关权益政策 |
| 暂无数据 |
| 收藏/分享 |
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
