气候变化领域集成服务门户(CCPortal): German efficiency gone wrong: Unintended incentives arising from the gas TSOs’ benchmarking

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DOI	10.1016/j.enpol.2021.112595
	German efficiency gone wrong: Unintended incentives arising from the gas TSOs’ benchmarking
	Waidelich P.; Haug T.; Wieshammer L.
发表日期	2022
ISSN	0301-4215
卷号	160
英文摘要	The German regulatory framework for gas transmission system operators features a regular efficiency benchmarking that aims to identify inefficient cost components and reduces the allowed revenues accordingly. Using a broad range of data envelopment analysis simulations based on the regulator's data and methodology, this paper identifies problems and potential side effects arising from the efficiency benchmarking. We find that the benchmarking results are highly sensitive to the selection of relevant cost drivers and hence may not reflect true efficiency for all network operators. In its current form, the benchmarking creates incentives to game the system and to favour physical network expansion over optimising network usage, which is undesirable given the uncertain demand outlook for gas networks. In addition, companies can face disincentives to forego specific types of expansion projects, which increases misallocation risks. As a remedy, we suggest to account for misspecification risks and reduce the scope for gaming behaviour when defining and selecting cost driver variables. In addition, network usage should be reflected in benchmarking specifications and regulator-approved network expansions that reduce the efficiency score due to properties of the underlying statistical method could be exempted from the benchmarking procedure. © 2021 Elsevier Ltd
英文关键词	Data envelopment analysis; Efficiency benchmarking; Gas transmission; Incentive regulation; Network regulation
语种	英语
scopus关键词	Cost reduction; Data envelopment analysis; Efficiency; Transmissions; Cost drivers; Efficiency benchmarking; Gas transmission; Gas transmission systems; Incentive regulations; Network expansion; Network regulation; Network usage; Regulatory frameworks; Transmission system operators; Benchmarking; benchmarking; data envelopment analysis; energy efficiency; gas production; incentive; regulatory framework; Germany
来源期刊	Energy Policy
文献类型	期刊论文
条目标识符	http://gcip.llas.ac.cn/handle/2XKMVOVA/256444
作者单位	Climate Finance and Policy Group, ETH Zürich, Clausiusstrasse 37, Zürich, 8092, Switzerland; NERA Economic Consulting, Unter den Linden 14, Berlin, 10117, Germany
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Waidelich P.,Haug T.,Wieshammer L.. German efficiency gone wrong: Unintended incentives arising from the gas TSOs’ benchmarking[J],2022,160.
APA	Waidelich P.,Haug T.,&Wieshammer L..(2022).German efficiency gone wrong: Unintended incentives arising from the gas TSOs’ benchmarking.Energy Policy,160.
MLA	Waidelich P.,et al."German efficiency gone wrong: Unintended incentives arising from the gas TSOs’ benchmarking".Energy Policy 160(2022).