气候变化领域集成服务门户(CCPortal): Promoting dynamic pricing implementation considering policy incentives and electricity retailers’ behaviors: An evolutionary game model based on prospect theory

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DOI	10.1016/j.enpol.2022.113059
	Promoting dynamic pricing implementation considering policy incentives and electricity retailers’ behaviors: An evolutionary game model based on prospect theory
	Dong J.; Jiang Y.; Liu D.; Dou X.; Liu Y.; Peng S.
发表日期	2022
ISSN	0301-4215
卷号	167
英文摘要	As one method of demand-side management, dynamic pricing benefits society by promoting power supply and demand balance, renewable energy consumption, and market efficiency improvement. However, due to the novelty of dynamic pricing, it has not been well promoted among consumers in China. The regulators, electricity retailers and consumers all have a critical role to play in promoting dynamic pricing, and they have both common interests and mutual constraints. Coordinating the interests of the three parties will facilitate the promotion of dynamic pricing. This study establishes an evolutionary game model for these three parties from a bounded rationality perspective and investigates each party's dynamic evolution strategy. The findings indicate that the subsidy from the regulator, the cost of promoting dynamic pricing, the electricity price level, the consumer's responsiveness, and psychological factors all influence the promotion of dynamic pricing. The findings suggest policy recommendations for accelerating the development of dynamic pricing and a healthy electricity retail market. © 2022 Elsevier Ltd
英文关键词	Dynamic pricing; Electricity retailers; Evolutionary game; Prospect theory
语种	英语
scopus关键词	Costs; Electric power systems; Energy utilization; Game theory; Power markets; Dynamic pricing; Electricity retailer; Evolutionary game models; Evolutionary games; Model-based OPC; Policy incentives; Power demands; Power supply; Prospect theory; Three-party; Sales; demand-side management; electricity supply; incentive; numerical model; policy implementation; price dynamics; retailing; theoretical study; China
来源期刊	Energy Policy
文献类型	期刊论文
条目标识符	http://gcip.llas.ac.cn/handle/2XKMVOVA/256161
作者单位	School of Economics and Management, North China Electric Power University, Beijing, 102206, China
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Dong J.,Jiang Y.,Liu D.,等. Promoting dynamic pricing implementation considering policy incentives and electricity retailers’ behaviors: An evolutionary game model based on prospect theory[J],2022,167.
APA	Dong J.,Jiang Y.,Liu D.,Dou X.,Liu Y.,&Peng S..(2022).Promoting dynamic pricing implementation considering policy incentives and electricity retailers’ behaviors: An evolutionary game model based on prospect theory.Energy Policy,167.
MLA	Dong J.,et al."Promoting dynamic pricing implementation considering policy incentives and electricity retailers’ behaviors: An evolutionary game model based on prospect theory".Energy Policy 167(2022).