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DOI | 10.1016/j.enpol.2020.111529 |
The impact of political directors on corporate strategy for government-owned utilities: Evidence from Ontario's electricity distribution sector | |
Fremeth A.R.; Holburn G.L.F. | |
发表日期 | 2020 |
ISSN | 03014215 |
卷号 | 143 |
英文摘要 | We contribute to research on governance of state-owned electric utilities by examining the implications of oversight by independent versus ‘political’ directors for corporate strategy. While policy think-tanks often recommend that governments appoint independent professional directors to boards of state-owned corporations, governments sometimes select politicians who bring a politically-oriented perspective to their oversight duties. To examine the potential strategic consequences, we draw on a novel survey of 384 directors of municipally-owned local electricity distribution companies in Canada, of which about a third were elected municipal councillors and the remaining were independent business professionals. The survey solicited individual director views about strategic priorities, including mergers and acquisitions, business diversification, and corporate financing options. Our statistical analysis of the survey response data finds that political directors, after controlling for prior executive experience and organizational context, were more risk-tolerant on average than independent directors, as evidenced by a greater willingness to diversify into unregulated business activities and to acquire equity stakes in other utilities; but at the same time, they prioritized enhanced dividend payments to the municipal government over re-investment in the corporation, a potential constraint on future business growth. © 2020 Elsevier Ltd |
关键词 | Corporate governanceElectric utilitiesGovernment ownershipOntario |
英文关键词 | Investments; Risk assessment; Surveys; Business professionals; Corporate strategies; Electricity distribution; Electricity distribution companies; Independent directors; Municipal government; Organizational context; Potential constraints; Electric utilities; corporate strategy; electricity generation; energy market; future prospect; governance approach; investment; merger; strategic approach; Canada; Ontario [Canada] |
语种 | 英语 |
来源期刊 | Energy Policy |
文献类型 | 期刊论文 |
条目标识符 | http://gcip.llas.ac.cn/handle/2XKMVOVA/204656 |
作者单位 | Western University, Ivey Business School, 1255 Western Road, London, ON N6G 0N1, Canada |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Fremeth A.R.,Holburn G.L.F.. The impact of political directors on corporate strategy for government-owned utilities: Evidence from Ontario's electricity distribution sector[J],2020,143. |
APA | Fremeth A.R.,&Holburn G.L.F..(2020).The impact of political directors on corporate strategy for government-owned utilities: Evidence from Ontario's electricity distribution sector.Energy Policy,143. |
MLA | Fremeth A.R.,et al."The impact of political directors on corporate strategy for government-owned utilities: Evidence from Ontario's electricity distribution sector".Energy Policy 143(2020). |
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