气候变化领域集成服务门户(CCPortal): Focusing climate negotiations on a uniform common commitment can promote cooperation

CCPortal

DOI	10.1073/pnas.2013070118
	Focusing climate negotiations on a uniform common commitment can promote cooperation
	Schmidt K.M.; Ockenfels A.
发表日期	2021
ISSN	00278424
卷号	118 期号:11
英文摘要	International cooperation on the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, disarmament, or free trade needs to be negotiated. The success of such negotiations depends on how they are designed. In the context of international climate change policy, it has been proposed [e.g., M. L. Weitzman J. Assoc. Environ. Resour. Econ. 1, 29-49 (2014)] that shifting the negotiation focus to a uniform common commitment (such as a uniform minimum carbon price) would lead to more ambitious cooperation. Yet, a proof-of-concept for this important claim is lacking. Based on game theoretical analyses, we present experimental evidence that strongly supports this conjecture. In our study, human subjects negotiate contributions to a public good. Subjects differ in their benefits and costs of cooperation. Participation in the negotiations and all commitments are voluntary. We consider treatments in which agreements are enforceable, and treatments in which they have to be self-enforcing. In both situations, negotiating a uniform common commitment is more successful in promoting cooperation than negotiating individual commitments (as in the Paris Agreement) and complex common commitments that tailor the commitment to the specific situation of each party (as attempted with the Kyoto Protocol). Furthermore, as suggested by our model, a uniform common commitment benefits most from being enforced. © 2021 National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
英文关键词	Climate policy; Common commitment; Cooperation; Negotiation design; Reciprocity
语种	英语
scopus关键词	adult; article; climate; France; human; negotiation; proof of concept; theoretical study
来源期刊	Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America
文献类型	期刊论文
条目标识符	http://gcip.llas.ac.cn/handle/2XKMVOVA/180238
作者单位	Department of Economics, University of Munich, Munich, 80539, Germany; CESifo, University of Munich, Munich, 80539, Germany; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), London, EC1V 0DX, United Kingdom; Department of Economics, University of Cologne, Cologne, 50923, Germany; Center for Social and Economic Behavior, University of Cologne, Cologne, 50931, Germany
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Schmidt K.M.,Ockenfels A.. Focusing climate negotiations on a uniform common commitment can promote cooperation[J],2021,118(11).
APA	Schmidt K.M.,&Ockenfels A..(2021).Focusing climate negotiations on a uniform common commitment can promote cooperation.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America,118(11).
MLA	Schmidt K.M.,et al."Focusing climate negotiations on a uniform common commitment can promote cooperation".Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 118.11(2021).