CCPortal
DOI10.1080/14693062.2019.1599803
How to operationalize accounting under Article 6 market mechanisms of the Paris Agreement
Müller B.; Michaelowa A.
发表日期2019
ISSN14693062
起始页码812
结束页码819
卷号19期号:7
英文摘要The role of market mechanisms was far from certain in the lead up to the 2015 Paris Climate Conference. The use of ‘constructive ambiguity’ led to Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, with Article 6.2 specifying a mechanism with limited international oversight, and Article 6.4 establishing a ‘Sustainable Development Mechanism’ (SDM) subject to detailed rules. Clear operationalization of these mechanisms remains a challenge, especially regarding the critical accounting issue that could not be resolved at the 2018 Katowice Climate Conference (COP24)–how to apply corresponding adjustments, especially regarding sectors not covered by targets under nationally-determined contributions (NDCs). By using fictitious examples, we explain two possible approaches to using Internationally Transferred Mitigation Outcomes (ITMOs) under Article 6.2 for achieving NDCs: a ‘target-based’ one where the acquiring Party adds the ITMO amount to the target level of its NDC; and a ‘tally-based’ one where the acquiring Party removes the ITMO amount from the final tally of its NDC. We discuss how these approaches influence the way to make corresponding adjustments and to avoid ‘double counting’. The first one leads to ‘target/budget-based accounting’, the second one to ‘emission-based accounting’. For mitigation outside the scope of the host Party's NDC, we propose using a tally-based interpretation of ITMO use, as opposed to the target-based variety used in the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, and stress the need for additionality testing. This interpretation allows for mandatory corresponding adjustments for all ITMO usage, while the host Party NDC level remains unchanged. A buffer registry is created for corresponding non-NDC adjustments of the selling party. Key policy insights Under the Paris Agreement, transfers of emissions units between two countries through the Article 6 mechanisms need a corresponding adjustment on both sides to prevent double counting. Corresponding adjustments can be applied either to emissions targets under NDCs or measured emissions levels. The transfer of emissions reduction credits generated outside an NDC should lead to a corresponding adjustment of a buffer registry of the selling country, but not its emissions level/NDC target. Such credits should only be generated if additionality of the reductions is shown. © 2019, © 2019 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.
英文关键词accounting; environmental integrity; market mechanisms; Paris Agreement; UNFCCC
语种英语
scopus关键词emission control; environmental economics; environmental policy; market; sustainable development; United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
来源期刊Climate Policy
文献类型期刊论文
条目标识符http://gcip.llas.ac.cn/handle/2XKMVOVA/153385
作者单位European Capacity Building Initiative, Oxford, United Kingdom; Wolfson College, University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom; Department of Political Science, University of Zurich, Zürich, Switzerland; Perspectives Climate Research, Freiburg, Germany
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Müller B.,Michaelowa A.. How to operationalize accounting under Article 6 market mechanisms of the Paris Agreement[J],2019,19(7).
APA Müller B.,&Michaelowa A..(2019).How to operationalize accounting under Article 6 market mechanisms of the Paris Agreement.Climate Policy,19(7).
MLA Müller B.,et al."How to operationalize accounting under Article 6 market mechanisms of the Paris Agreement".Climate Policy 19.7(2019).
条目包含的文件
条目无相关文件。
个性服务
推荐该条目
保存到收藏夹
导出为Endnote文件
谷歌学术
谷歌学术中相似的文章
[Müller B.]的文章
[Michaelowa A.]的文章
百度学术
百度学术中相似的文章
[Müller B.]的文章
[Michaelowa A.]的文章
必应学术
必应学术中相似的文章
[Müller B.]的文章
[Michaelowa A.]的文章
相关权益政策
暂无数据
收藏/分享

除非特别说明,本系统中所有内容都受版权保护,并保留所有权利。