气候变化领域集成服务门户(CCPortal): Elite capture risk and mitigation in decentralized forest governance regimes

CCPortal

DOI	10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2013.12.005
	Elite capture risk and mitigation in decentralized forest governance regimes
	Persha L.; Andersson K.
发表日期	2014
ISSN	0959-3780
卷号	24 期号:1
英文摘要	Recent scholarship focuses on elite capture as a driver of social inequality and a source of policy failure across a wide range of governance initiatives. In the context of environmental governance, concerns center on perceived links between elite capture and decentralization, particularly in developing countries where decentralized natural resource governance has been widely implemented. But, there is limited empirical knowledge regarding if, and the conditions under which, decentralization might promote elite capture, or whether institutional design factors can militate against it. We examine how local institutional arrangements under forest sector decentralization affect the risk of elite capture of forest benefits, as well as the potential for a key institutional design factor (linkages to external organizations as an accountability-building mechanism) to mitigate this risk. We analyze forest product harvesting data as well as social, ecological, and institutional data from pre- and post-decentralization across 56 forests and 174 community groups in four countries. We employ hierarchical linear modeling to test the extent to which decentralization is associated with inequities in the distribution of forest harvest benefits within communities, and to characterize the institutional arrangements that affect elite capture outcomes. We find not only strong evidence for increased local rule-making under decentralization, but also significantly higher risk of elite capture of forest harvest benefits. This risk increases with increasing time since decentralization, but it is also substantially moderated in cases where an external organization was involved in organizing the local forest institution. Our findings highlight ways in which decentralization reforms are filtered by institutional arrangements to produce different outcomes, and generate new knowledge on micro-institutional factors that can reduce the risk of elite capture in decentralized environmental governance regimes. © 2013 Elsevier Ltd.
英文关键词	Decentralization; Forests; Governance; Inequality; Institutions
语种	英语
来源期刊	Global Environmental Change
文献类型	期刊论文
条目标识符	http://gcip.llas.ac.cn/handle/2XKMVOVA/117829
作者单位	Department of Geography, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Campus Box #3220, Chapel Hill, NC 27599-3220, United States; Department of Political Science, University of Colorado at Boulder, Boulder, CO 80309-0333, United States
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Persha L.,Andersson K.. Elite capture risk and mitigation in decentralized forest governance regimes[J],2014,24(1).
APA	Persha L.,&Andersson K..(2014).Elite capture risk and mitigation in decentralized forest governance regimes.Global Environmental Change,24(1).
MLA	Persha L.,et al."Elite capture risk and mitigation in decentralized forest governance regimes".Global Environmental Change 24.1(2014).